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Section 25 of the Florida Constitution, entitled “Patients’ Right to Know
About Adverse Medical Incidents” and more commonly known as
Amendment 7 (“Amendment 7”), will have a significant practical impact
on patient care and medical peer review in Florida. 1 Legally,
Amendment 7 contributed to the need for a federal statutory peer review
privilege, which Congress recognized by enacting the Patient Safety and
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”). 2 Now, in addition to the
PSQIA, some federal courts appear ready to consider an expanded
This comment addresses the current
common law privilege.3
applicability of Amendment 7 in the wake of the PSQIA and the
foundation that has been set to undo Amendment 7, and establish an
expanded common law privilege in the name of promoting patient safety
and encouraging meaningful medical peer review. 4
This comment lays the foundation to evaluate the sustainability of
Amendment 7 post-PSQIA in Part II by first examining medical peer
review, its origin, its evolution and why peer review remains important
to patient safety. 5 Although many physicians dislike peer review,6
1. Amendment 7 was passed by a vote of 81.2 % in favor and 18.8 % against. November 2,
2004 General Election: Official Results, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS,
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/ (select “2004 General” election from
dropdown menu; then select “Const. Amendments” from dropdown menu) (last visited Mar. 2,
2013) (cited in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 n.1 (Fla. 2008)).
Amendment 7’s proposed statement and purpose was presented as follows:
The Legislature has enacted provisions relating to a patient’s bill of rights and
responsibilities, including provisions relating to information about practitioners’
qualifications, treatment and financial aspects of patient care. The Legislature has,
however, restricted public access to information concerning a particular health care
provider’s or facility’s investigations, incidents or history of acts, neglects, or defaults
that have injured patients or had the potential to injure patients. This information may be
important to a patient. The purpose of this amendment is to create a constitutional right
for a patient or potential patient to know and have access to records of a health care
facility’s or provider’s adverse medical incidents, including medical malpractice and
other acts which have caused or have the potential to cause injury or death. This right to
know is to be balanced against an individual patient’s rights to privacy and dignity, so
that the information available relates to the practitioner or facility as opposed to
individuals who may have been or are patients.
Advisory Op. re: Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla.
2004).
2. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”), Pub. L. No. 109-41,
119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006)). The stated
purpose of the PSQIA was: “[t]o amend title IX of the Public Health Service Act to provide for the
improvement of patient safety and to reduce the incidence of events that adversely effect patient
safety.” PSQIA
3. See cases discussed infra notes 159-167.
4. See infra notes 136-143, 169-179 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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Congress has acknowledged its importance by making peer review
mandatory and by providing the statutory protections to ensure peer
review remains meaningful. 7 States have followed suit, passing their
own laws that provide for the protection of peer review materials. 8 Part
II also addresses how Amendment 7 reversed Florida’s historical
approach providing broad peer review protection and how this erosion of
peer review protection served as a foundation for the federal statutory
protections provided by the PSQIA. 9
Part III, the Statement of the Issue, describes the losing arguments
that hospitals 10 attempted to employ to protect against Amendment 7
requests, and why, in lieu of a new PSQIA argument, Amendment 7 is
ripe for new round of litigation. 11 Part IV provides an overview of
PSQIA’s framework and explains how the practical implementation of
the PSQIA’s statutory protection limits Amendment 7. 12 Furthermore,
this analysis section explores the likelihood of a common law medical
peer review privilege, and why the trend in federal courts and the
analytical framework applied by the United States Supreme Court
suggests an expanded common law peer review privilege may become a
reality. 13 In closing, this comment discusses why the benefits of an
expanded medical peer review privilege outweigh the risks, and
identifies current Florida litigation that may undo Amendment 7 and
completely restore meaningful peer review in Florida. 14
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Medical Peer Review & its Role Improving Patient Care

The beginning of medical peer review dates back to 1918 when the
American College of Surgeons (“ACS”) established the first peer review
program in the United States as a review body charged with improving
the quality of patient care. 15 The ACS ultimately evolved into the Joint
7. See infra notes 54-62, 110-117 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 50-51, 175 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text.
10. While the term “hospital” is used throughout this comment, the PSQIA and peer review
discussion within applies broadly to any healthcare organization or healthcare facility.
11. See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 123-143 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 145-166 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 180-191 and accompanying text.
15. Alissa Marie Bassler, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and Recognize a
Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 691 (2003). This first program, known as
the Hospital Accreditation Program, was formed with the intent to improve the quality of hospital
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Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations
(“JCAHO”), 16 which requires hospitals and healthcare organizations to
conduct peer review of staff members in order to receive JCAHO’s
accreditation. 17
Peer review is a process in which the actions of health care
providers are reviewed to determine the appropriateness of care that was
provided. 18 Peer review is predominately performed by physicians and
other health care professionals who are members of a hospital’s medical
staff. 19 The medical staff members are selected by hospital leadership
care. Id.
16. The Joint Commission is a national non-profit accrediting body and standards-setting
organization for health care providers. Frederick Levy, Darren Mareniss, Corianne Iacovelli &
Jeffrey Howard, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 31 J. OF LEGAL MED. 4:
397, 406 (2010). JCAHO has been in operation since 1951 and is governed by a Board of
Commissioners that is composed of health care professionals, policy experts, ethicists, and
stakeholders’ representatives. Facts about The Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMMISSION (Jan. 3,
2013), http://www.jointcommission.org/facts_about_the_joint_commission/. JCAHO’s primary
function is to audit and accredit hospitals, hospice services, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers,
and laboratories to ensure compliance with regulatory standards. Id.
17. George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial
Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2001). JCAHO is considered
the foremost hospital accreditation authority and participation plays a critical role in the economic
sustainability of a hospital because eligibility for federal funds, such as Medicare, depends on
successfully achieving accreditation. See Murray G. Sagsveen & Jennifer L. Thompson, The
Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North Dakota, 73 N.D. L. REV. 477, 478 n.6 (1997); Talia
Storch, Note and Comment, Medical Peer Review in Florida: Is the Privilege Under Attack?, 32
NOVA L. REV. 269, 273 (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2011).
18. Eric Scott Bell, Comment, Make Way: Why Arkansas and the States Should Narrow
Health Care Peer Review Privileges for the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 62
ARK. L. REV. 745, 749 (2009). For example, hospitals often review specific care to determine
appropriate treatment, correctness of billing, quality assurance and utilization of care. Id. at 749750. Peer review committees participate in intra-committee discussion focused on evaluating the
specific and general performance of the hospital in an effort to identify, isolate and remedy
incidents of medical error. Id. There are three premises that underline traditional peer review:
The first premise is that due to their unique and specialized training, only physicians can
properly evaluate and judge other physicians’ medical practices and detect when
colleagues pose a risk to patient care. The second premise is that a milieu supporting
candid communication is most likely to foster recognition of both exemplary and
substandard care. The third premise is that peer review participants are motivated to
maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.
Ilene N. Moore, et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006).
19. As an example, Lee Memorial Hospital, part of Lee Memorial Health System, defines the
term “medical staff” in its Medical Staff Bylaws as “those practitioners who are authorized by the
Board to exercise privileges at one or more of the System’s hospitals, and, on a component basis,
those practitioners who are authorized by the Board to exercise privileges at a particular system
hospital.” Lee Memorial Hospital Medical Staff Bylaws, LEE MEM’L HEALTH SYS. 6 (June 16,
2011), http://www.leememorial.org/physicianpub/pdf/BYLAWS/LMHBYLAWS06-16-11.pdf. The
Bylaws go onto describe the nature of medical staff membership as:
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and organized as a peer review committee. 20 This committee is tasked to
both review the qualifications and training of new applicants as well as
to critique the services rendered by physicians already practicing at the
hospital. 21 Functionally, peer review leads to efficient evaluation
because practicing physicians have the expertise to evaluate peers’ work
and are best positioned to review the competence of other practicing
physicians they regularly observe. 22
Peer review is important to improving health care quality because
of the role it plays in identifying best practices and reducing medical
Historically, civil medical malpractice claims were the
error. 23
cornerstone vehicle used to regulate patient safety in the United States.24
[A] privilege that shall be extended only to professionally competent physicians (M.D.
or D.O.), dentists, podiatrists and/or psychologists who continuously meet the
qualifications, standards, and requirements set forth in these Bylaws . . . Medical Staff
membership is a privilege and not a right of any practitioner or other person. Medical
Staff membership and the exercise of privileges in connection therewith shall be
extended only to practitioners who continuously meet the requirements of these Bylaws.
Id. at 7.
20. Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review
Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 173 (1992/1993). Since the
hospital’s board and administration is generally made up of individuals without the qualifications to
evaluate medical care, evaluation and review tasks are delegated to members of the medical staff.
Id. at 173-174. Ultimately, however, the hospital’s board is responsible for any harm or risk of
injury to patients. Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelly C. Pickering & Shannon M. Webb, Quality Assurance
and Hospital Structure: How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12
ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 237 (2003). Because hospitals believe the level of quality care depends on
effective peer review, governing boards work diligently to eliminate the barriers to effective peer
review. Id.
21. Newton, supra note 17, at 725. In order to ensure impartiality, committee members are
generally composed of unbiased practicing physicians who are not in direct competition with the
physician under review. Id. Although ultimate decisions on any disciplinary actions taken against
the reviewed physician are made by the hospital’s governing board, the peer review committee
makes a recommendation that is highly influential. Id. For initial applicants, the process involves
the review of the applicant’s training and overall clinical experience; a review process referred to as
credentialing because it is based primarily on the physicians’ credentials, such as training,
certification and demonstrated ability. Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost
But No Benefit – Is it Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 14 (1999).
22. Newton, supra note 17, at 724. The peer review system, along with state licensing board
disciplinary action and the medical malpractice system, serve as the three primary tools to monitor
the quality of care provided by physicians. Id. Despite the existence of alternatives, peer review is
widely accepted as the primary means to weed out low quality physicians and identify physicians
whose skills require improvement. Scheutzow, supra note 21, at, 14-15.
23. See Patricia A. Sullivan & Jon M. Anderson, The Health Care Debate: If Lack of Tort
Reform is Part of the Problem, Federalized Protection for Peer Review Needs to be Part of the
Solution, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 41 (2010). Unlike the tort system, peer review is capable
of “maximizing efficient health care outcomes.” Id. at 46.
24. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 400. The primary purpose of
medical malpractice cases is to assign financial responsibility for the harm caused; however, this
retroactive approach focusing on a single incident does little to address systematic problems of the
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Civil medical malpractice, however, fails to accomplish many patientfocused goals because it only addresses negligent care that actually
causes damage; thus care that falls below quality standards but does not
cause damage goes unaddressed. 25 Peer review protects future patients
from medical error by ensuring that affiliated practitioners practice
properly and have the qualifications, training and experience necessary
to provide quality care. 26 When peer review committees engage in
meaningful peer review, the process accomplishes three important
purposes: (1) it leads to higher quality health care by rooting out
incompetence and error; (2) it reassures patients that they are receiving
quality care; and (3) it leads to a reduction in health care costs by
allowing hospitals to self-regulate and increase efficiencies. 27 Achieving
these important purposes requires more than just peer review for peer
review’s sake—it requires that peer review is meaningful and effective
at uncovering and remedying substandard care.28 Consequently,
meaningful peer review requires candid communication between
committee members that detects and identifies both exemplary and
substandard care, and motivates all medical staff members to maintain
excellent skills and professional standards.29
B.

Why Many Physicians Dislike Peer Review

Overall, peer review is considered a public good.30 It offers
incentives for similarly trained physicians working in the same hospital
to identify colleagues with knowledge gaps or skill deficiencies,
health care industry and fails to prevent future errors. Id.
25. Id. The author argues for a more proactive approach to regulating patient safety in the
United States, primarily through the mechanism of peer review. Id.
26. Id. (citing Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and
Federal Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003)). Hospitals and
advocacy groups often characterize peer review as a risk management tool because of its aim to
reduce medical errors. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 401.
27. Bassler, supra note 15, at 691-692. “When hospital conditions and patient care improve
and the rates of death and disease decline, the number of medical malpractice lawsuits should
decline. Peer review thus seeks to identify and eliminate these systematic ‘accidents waiting to
happen,’ thereby maximizing efficient health care outcomes.” Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23,
at 46 (citing Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1074-76 (R.I. 2006); Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren,
Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems
Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 530 (2004)).
28. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Montalbano
v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 264 P.3d 944 (Idaho 2011) No. 37573-2010, 2010 WL
5497832, at *8 (discussing why peer review merely for the sake of compliance with Joint
Commission standards is not the goal).
29. Bell, supra note 18, at 753.
30. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51.
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facilitate their improvement, and monitor progress and future
performance. 31 Regardless of its many benefits, not all physicians are
enamored with peer review. 32 First, peer review committee members are
often direct colleagues or friends with the reviewed physician and
understand that a disciplinary recommendation that leads to a
termination of clinical privileges may have a devastating effect on the
reviewed physician’s career, while also ending any friendship. 33
Second, committee members may be reluctant to participate in the peer
review process because they do not want their evaluations and appraisals
of a fellow physician’s competence later disclosed.34 Third, committee
members may have concerns over retaliation in the form of a lawsuit
against the peer review committee. 35 Finally, peer review may be time
consuming and lead to less billable time or loss of referrals. 36 Thus, in
the face of abounding disincentives, physicians are often reluctant to
voluntarily participate in the peer review process, and when they do
there is little incentive to participate aggressively and meaningfully. 37 In
recognition of the need for meaningful peer review, state and federal

31. Storch, supra note 17, at 278. This internal committee is generally preferred to external
parties assuming review responsibility because when serious problems are identified, the hospital
can take proactive steps to limit the doctor’s further interaction with patients before government
agencies get involved. Id.
32. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 50. One of the reasons physicians dislike peer
review is because fundamentally peer review entails acknowledging error and doctors are not
supposed to make mistakes, let alone admit and apologize for them. Id.
33. Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will
Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1988). The negative
repercussions that follow a substandard review may have lasting effects that include, but are not
limited to, damaged reputation, loss of income, patients and malpractice insurance, the stigma
associated with a negative review and potential difficulty finding future employment elsewhere.
Storch, supra note 17, at 275.
34. Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 18. Especially in cases where the reviewing physician
knows or considers the reviewed physician a friend, the reviewing physician may only be willing to
testify as part of a confidential peer review process where the testimony will not be revealed during
a malpractice or other legal action. Id.
35. Some physician’s disciplined through the peer review process have brought successful
suits against peer review participants and the hospital under an antitrust theory, arguing the peer
review activity was undertaken to decrease the number of competing physician’s in the reviewing
physician’s practice area. Spaeth, Pickering & Webb, supra note 20, at 241 (citing Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (finding that peer review activities were not protected from
application of federal antitrust laws where a surgeon alleged violations of the Sherman Act against
reviewing physicians)).
36. Morter, supra note 33, at 1140.
37. Newton, supra note 17, at 727. Weighing against the disincentives discussed within this
paragraph are the possible ethical concerns for quality of patient care or concerns for reputation and
accreditation status of a reviewer’s hospital that may motivate a physician’s voluntary involvement
in the peer review process. Id. at 726.
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immunity, confidentiality and privilege protections must work together
to facilitate the existence of a functional peer review system. 38
C.

Peer Review Immunity, Confidentiality & Privilege

Federal and state laws generally grant protection to the peer review
process in one or more of three ways: (1) providing immunity from
lawsuits to peer review committee members; (2) requiring individuals
participating in peer review to keep information about the process and
conclusions confidential; and (3) making peer review information
privileged. 39 Immunity is an exemption from liability against a suit
brought by a plaintiff. 40 “Congress and practically every state legislature
have enacted statutes that immunize those persons participating in the
peer review process.” 41
Confidentiality protection focuses on the obligation to refrain from
disclosing information to third parties outside of the judicial process.42

38. See id. at 735.
39. Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 9.
40. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 55 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co.
v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265, 287 (1913)). Because immunity deprives a plaintiff of a potential
remedy, courts typically construe immunity provisions narrowly. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note
23, at 55 (citing Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.
2007)).
41. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 55. Specifically, the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act immunity provided by Congress is a qualified immunity and does not extend to
other forms of relief. Id. at 52. The Health Care Quality Improvement Act will be discussed in
greater detail later in this comment. See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text. For language
from state immunity statutes, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (West 2012) (“No
individual who is a member of or works for or on behalf of a peer review committee of a health care
entity shall be liable in damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct
within the scope of the functions of the peer review committee.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-21-2-6
(West 2011) (“The governing board and the governing board’s employees, agents, consultants, and
attorneys have absolute immunity from civil liability for communications, discussions, actions
taken, and reports made concerning disciplinary action or investigation taken or contemplated if the
reports or actions are made in good faith and without malice.”); MINN. STAT. § 145.63 (West 2012).
(“No review organization and no person who is a member [of] . . . a review organization shall be
liable for damages or other relief in any action brought by a person or persons whose activities have
been or are being scrutinized or reviewed by a review organization . . . .”).
42. Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 35. Confidentiality may be imposed by law or contract;
thus, from a practical perspective, all hospitals should contractually require that peer review
participants keep peer review information confidential. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 196197. Furthermore, hospital bylaws should require medical staff members participating in peer
review to keep all information confidential and as part of the appointment process to any peer
review committee, the hospital should require that each participant sign an agreement to keep the
information confidential. Id. at 196. “This gives rise to a contractual claim for breach of contract
should any participant breach the confidentiality and voluntarily testify or divulge peer review
information.” Id.
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To achieve meaningful peer review, confidentiality is a must:
Confidentiality is essential to the proper functioning of peer review.
First, confidentiality promotes the candid, free flow of information
between physicians who are part of the peer review committee.
Second, and probably most importantly to the physicians on the
committee, confidentiality protects reviewing members of the
committee from being forced to disclose documents and statements
made during the peer review process if they are later sued by the
43
physicians they review.

Confidentiality concerns impact peer review participants’ willingness to
participate meaningfully in the peer review process, thus lack, or any
perceived lack, of confidentiality may lead to the obliteration of
meaningful peer review. 44 Historically, Florida courts had repeatedly
articulated the significance of confidentiality to peer review and
improved healthcare quality, going as far as stating that lack of
confidentiality will terminate meaningful peer review. 45
Lastly, privilege protection is the right to keep information from
being used as evidence. 46 Generally, privilege ascribed to peer review
43. Bassler, supra note 15, at 703-704. Commentators have stated that voluntary disclosure
of peer review findings may be particularly damaging to the process. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra
note 20, at 192. See, e.g., West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1986) (holding
California’s privilege statute did not prohibit a peer review participant from voluntarily testifying as
to the proceedings reasoning). “Obviously, interpretations such as West Covina would render
absolutely meaningless any corresponding peer review privilege protection that exists as physicians
would always be concerned that one of the participants would choose voluntarily to disclose the
proceedings.” Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 191. See also, e.g., Babcock v. Bridgeport
Hosp., 742 A.2d 322, 344 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 388 (Miss.
1998) (“Only where . . . peer review committees . . . are assured of confidentiality [will they] feel
free to enter into uninhibited discussions of their peers.”)); Young v. Western Pa. Hosp., 722 A.2d
153, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“The need for confidentiality in the peer review process stems from
the need for comprehensive, honest, and sometimes critical evaluations of medical providers by
their peers in the profession.”); Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 70 P.3d 444, 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003)
(“The confidentiality of peer review committee proceedings is essential to achieve complete
investigation and review of medical care.”); Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 597 (“The
theory is that a confidential environment will encourage physician candor and participation in the
process. This, the theory goes, will result in better doctors and ultimately better health care.”).
44. Morter, supra note 33, at 1130-1131.
45. James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know
Come at Too High a Price?, 24 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 9 (2005). “Confidentiality is essential
to . . . [medical review committee] meetings; and these meetings are essential to the continued
improvement in the care and treatment of patients . . . . To subject these discussions and
deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in
terminating such deliberations.” Id. (citing Dade County Med. Ass’n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979)).
46. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 179. “The recognition of a privilege with respect
to communications between parties or with respect to an institution’s self-examination of its
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has been a legislative creation utilized to achieve open and effective peer
review. 47 Thus, this privilege is institutional in nature, created not to aid
the individual peer review participants, but to protect the institution of
peer review, and indirectly the public who rely on peer review to
increase the quality of healthcare. 48 Said another way, if peer review
privilege is compromised, the net result will lessen efforts to improve
healthcare and the patient outcomes will suffer as a result.49 In
recognition of the need for meaningful peer review and the importance
of privilege protection, “all fifty states and the District of Columbia have
created an evidentiary privilege for peer review information.” 50
However, despite this near universal recognition of peer review
privilege, the scope of privileges granted by the states varies. 51
Therefore, physicians may have to speculate about the scope of the
applicable statutory privilege, thus discouraging aggressive and
meaningful peer review participation. 52 To achieve meaningful and
effective peer review, protections must be consistent, a principle
recognized by Congress and the United States Supreme Court. 53
activities represents ‘an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony upon all
facts inquired in a court of justice.’” Id.
47. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 181. The primary justification for privilege is that
protecting peer review participants from having to testify against reviewed physicians promotes
candor during peer review proceedings. B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in
Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 154 (1984).
48. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 181 (“Clearly the peer review privilege was created
to encourage peer review and thus protect the institutions performing peer review and not to protect
the individuals who were subject to review.”).
49. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
28, at *13-14 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970) (concluding the
value of the peer review process would be destroyed if the meetings and the names of those
participating were to be opened to the discovery process)).
50. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
28, at *8 (citing KD v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D. Del. 2010) (citing Ghazal
Sharifi, Is the Door Open or Closed? Evaluating the Future of the Federal Medical Peer-Review
Privilege, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 564 (2009)).
51. Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 188. As one author opined, peer review laws are:
[A] crazy quilt of statutes that pertain to a variety of committees and afford often
incomplete or incomprehensible protection to committee members and/or staff,
witnesses, documents, spectators, and so forth, but are seldom clear with respect to the
exact nature of the protection that is provided to whom, what, or under what
circumstances.
Morter, supra note 33, at 1132.
52. Morter, supra note 33, at 1137. In contrast, the author argues that the application of peer
review privilege in a consistent manner will encourage meaningful and effective peer review. Id.
53. See Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra
note 28, at *20. The Brief acknowledges that privileges are generally only effective when
individuals whose communications are being protected know, at the time of communication, that the
communication will be kept private. Id. “The United States Supreme Court, among others, has
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Congress Responds with HCQIA

Prior to the healthcare reform initiatives and importance placed on
peer review discussed herein, Congress recognized the importance of
peer review by requiring that hospitals participating in Medicare
implement peer review programs. 54 Also, Congress statutorily provided
peer review protections of medical programs offered by the Department
of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs. 55 In 1986,
attempting to extend state peer review immunities on a federal level,
Congress passed the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of
1986 (“HCQIA”). 56
In short, the HCQIA drafters felt that by improving the peer review
process, the quality of healthcare across the country would improve. 57
recognized this principle, stating that if the purpose of a privilege is to be served, ‘the participants in
the confidential conversation must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether
particular discussions will be protected.’” Id. (quoting Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996)
(discussing the expansion of the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
54. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51. This recognition originally manifested
itself pursuant to Congress’ spending power, when Congress mandated that hospitals have peer
review programs to participate in Medicare. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-3(a) (West 2013).
55. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51-52. Congress has afforded peer review
protection for medical programs offered by the Department of Defense and the Department of
Veteran Affairs. See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a) (West 2013) (“Medical quality assurance records
created by the Department of Defense as part of a medical quality assurance program are
confidential and privileged.”). See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5705(a) (West 2013) (“Records and
documents created by the Department [of Veteran Affairs] as part of a medical assurance
program . . . are confidential and privileged [absent an exception].”).
56. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (West 2013). The HCQIA was an attempt to address the
national health care quality assurance problem that was resulting from local peer review
committees’ inability to report medical error findings because of the confidentiality requirement of
state peer review statutes. Newton, supra note 17, at 732. “Consequently, a physician whose
privileges were revoked could simply relocate with little fear of having his or her previous
incompetence discovered. Additionally, hospitals were often willing to accept the voluntary
resignation of incompetent physicians in exchange for silence regarding the events leading up to the
resignation.” Id. Responding to this problem, the HCQIA established a framework requiring
notification to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) when a hospital board’s decision
adversely affects a physician’s privileges for longer than thirty days. Id. The reporting
requirements are a mandatory provision of the HCQIA and failure to comply may result in the loss
of HCQIA immunity. Id.
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11101. The statute provides an overview of the HCQIA by stating that:
Congress finds the following: (1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and
the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that
warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State;
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from
State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s previous damaging or
incompetent performance; (3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through
effective professional peer review; (4) The threat of private money damage liability
under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law,
unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer
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Congress believed it could improve the peer review process by providing
further protection to physicians serving in review capacities by assuring
immunity from civil litigation.58 The HCQIA was designed to shield
participants in professional review actions by providing immunity from
liability so long as the appropriate procedural requirements were met.59
Under the HCQIA, the immunity afforded is qualified; requiring that the
peer review activity has been conducted:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality
of care (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter (3)
after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the
physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the
physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that
the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable
60
effort to obtain facts.

review; and (5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection
for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review.
Id. “Under this bill, hospitals and physicians that conduct peer review will be protected from
damages in suits by physicians who lose their hospital privileges, provided the peer review actions
meet the due process and other standards established in the bill.” H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 2
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6385. Hospitals and physicians that discipline
doctors are required to report these disciplinary actions to the state medical boards, who will
forward this information to the Department of Health and Human Services. Id. The bill further
requires hospitals to query the NPDB before hiring doctors or other licensed health care
practitioners. Id.
58. Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State
and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 113 (1999-2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. §
11101 (West 1995)).
59. Lu Ann Trevino, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or Shield?, 22 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 331 (1997). “Peer reviewers who improperly use the process lose their
immunity from liability and discovery.” Id. at 328. “Congress meant to prevent peer review
committees from using their power and immunity as swords against innocent practitioners.” Id.
(citing Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (finding that a hospital boycott of a
physician and publication of false disciplinary actions were restraint of trade); Patrick v. Burget,
486 U.S. 94 (1988) (holding that state-action doctrine did not protect Oregon physicians from
federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review committee actions)).
60. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11112(a)(1)-(4). The statute goes onto say that “a professional review
action shall be presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in
section 11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. Some critics claim the existence of immunity for peer review activities is
unnecessary to protect hospitals from damage arising from negligent peer review suits:
According to these critics, if Congress were to repeal the HCQIA tomorrow, and all the
state legislatures were to follow suit, hospitals would still have the oft-cited incentive of
improving patient care as an impetus to continuing their peer review activities. The flaw
in that argument is that the cost of those improvements would increase dramatically, and
as the price went up, less health care would be available. To the extent that physicians
declined to participate in peer review activities, hospitals could easily rectify that
problem by indemnifying them or procuring insurance. In doing so, the cost of peer
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Ultimately, while the HCQIA provided the individual peer review
committee members immunity from damages liability, it did not extend
necessary protections to peer review documents and activities. 61 Thus,
as discussed herein, Florida hospitals relying on the HCQIA to protect
peer review documents found that Congress did not provide such
protection in the HCQIA. 62
E.

Medical Peer Review in Florida

Prior to Amendment 7, Florida statutes provided expansive peer
review protection. 63 Florida restricted patients’ access to information
regarding adverse medical incidents through a collection of statutes that
provided hospitals great latitude to regulate themselves through private
action. 64 Often cited Florida case law states that these statutes were
enacted to control the escalating cost of health care by encouraging selfregulation by the medical profession through peer review and
evaluation. 65 As the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, “[t]he
privilege afforded to peer review committees is intended to prohibit the
chilling effect of the potential public disclosure of statements made to or
information prepared for and used by the committee in carrying out its
peer review function.” 66 The Florida legislature made meaningful peer
review would be borne by hospitals, not patients. Even if that were true, however, the
issue would be whether the total cost to society still increased.
Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 58.
61. See, e.g., West Florida Reg’l Med.Ctr., Inc. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 1d D.C.A. 2009)
(holding that Congress did not provide for confidentiality or privilege of peer review records or
communications, but did provide peer review participants with immunity from liability).
62. See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text.
63. Graham, supra note 58, at 125.
64. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §395.0193(7) (West 2013) and §766.101(5) (West 2013)
(establishing confidentiality of proceedings and reports in peer review proceedings); FLA. STAT.
§395.0191(8) (West 2013) (granting immunity from discovery to investigations, records, and
reports regarding credentialing); FLA. STAT. §395.0193 (West 2013) and §766.101(5) (West 2013)
(granting immunity from discovery to peer review investigations, records, and reports); FLA. STAT.
§395.0197(6)(c) and (7) (West 2013) (providing confidentiality and privilege protection for annual
risk management reports of adverse incidents); FLA. STAT. §766.1016(2) (West 2013) (“Patient
safety data shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil or
administrative action.”); FLA. STAT. §395.0193(8) (West 2013) (providing testimonial and
discovery immunity for investigations, proceedings, and records of the peer review body); FLA.
STAT. §395.0193(1) (West 2013) (granting immunity from retaliatory tort suits to physicians
participating in the peer review process in good faith).
65. Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 113 (1992) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219-20
(1984) (interpreting former section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes, the predecessor to section 766.101)).
66. Cruger, 599 So.2d at 114-115. Expanding on the reasons stated above for why many
physicians dislike peer review, the Cruger court stated that this chilling effect is attributable to
several factors; specifically, doctors are reluctant to engage in peer review because they fear “loss of
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review possible by providing a guarantee of confidentiality for the peer
review process, most explicitly in Florida Statute, Section 766.101(5). 67
Florida courts, relying on the collection of statutes referenced above,
consistently upheld a liberal interpretation of Florida’s peer review
confidentiality and privilege laws.68
referrals, respect, and friends, possible retaliations, vulnerability to torts, and fear of malpractice
actions in which the records of the peer review proceedings might be used.” Id. at 115 (citing
Gregory G. Gosfield, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L. Q.
552, 558 (1979)).
67. See Cruger, 599 So.2d at 113. Florida Statutes Section 766.101(5) reads:
The investigations, proceedings, and records of a [medical review] committee . . . shall
not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a
provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject
of evaluation and review by such committee, and no person who was in attendance at a
meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil
action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings
of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or
other actions of such committee or any members thereof.
FLA. STAT. §766.101(5) (West 2013). For examples of other State statutes accomplishing similar
purposes, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §22-21-8 (West 2012) (“Written reports, records,
correspondence . . . shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction
in evidence in any civil action against a health care professional or institution arising out of matters
which are the subject of evaluation and review . . . .”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-445.01 (West
2013) (“All proceedings, records and materials prepared in connection with [peer] reviews . . .
including all peer reviews of individual health care providers practicing in and applying to practice
in hospitals or outpatient surgical centers and the records of such reviews, are confidential and are
not subject to discovery.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §19a-17b(d) (West 2013) (“The proceedings of a
medical review committee conducting a peer review shall not be subject to discovery or
introduction into evidence in any civil action for or against a health care provider arising out of the
matters which are subject to evaluation and review by such committee . . . .”); D.C. CODE §44805(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The files, records, findings, opinions, recommendations, evaluations, and
reports of a peer review body . . . shall be confidential and shall be neither discoverable nor
admissible into evidence in any civil, criminal, legislative, or administrative proceeding.”); GA.
CODE ANN. §31-7-133(a) (West 2013) (“The proceedings and records of a review organization shall
be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil
action . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-21.22(e)(f) (West 2013) (“No person participating in good faith
in the peer review [program] . . . shall be required in a civil case to disclose any information
acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations acquired or developed solely in the course of
participating in [peer review].”).
68. See Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Roundtree, 721 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1998) (holding that a defendant doctor is not required to disclose matters which were the subject of
evaluation and review by a medical peer review committee regarding the doctor’s staff privileges
that were taken during an oral deposition because the information concerning the actions taken by
the committee are protected by the peer review statute); Cruger, 599 So.2d at 111 (holding that
mother’s request for copies of physician’s applications for hospital privileges after physician’s
alleged negligent treatment of her son’s fractured thumb were protected because statutory privilege
protects any document considered by medical review committee or hospital board as part of its
decision-making process); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (holding that discovery
privilege is not limited to medical malpractice actions and, in fact, includes defamation actions
arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by hospital credentials
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The paradigm shift from expansive protection to Amendment 7
resulted from a decades-long battle between doctors, insurance
companies, and tort reformers on one side, and trial lawyers, patients’
rights advocates, and civil justice proponents on the other.69 Many
defense lawyers believe that Amendment 7 was proposed by plaintiff
lawyers as a direct response to Article I, Section 26 of the Florida
Constitution, entitled “Claimant’s Right to Fair Compensation,”
commonly known at Amendment 3 (“Amendment 3”). 70 Amendment 3
was another 2004 Florida initiative championed by the Florida Medical
Association that sought tort reform by delineating attorney caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice negligence actions,
essentially ensuring a greater percentage of the damage award to the
claimant. 71
Due to a well-coordinated effort launched by Floridians for Patient
Protection 72 over 480,000 signatures were secured to put the
Amendment 7 initiative on the ballot.73 Amendment 7 was approved by
committees).
69. J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity of
Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of Florida, 83-Mar FLA. B. J. 20 (2009) (citing Mary Ellen
Klas, Doctors, Lawyers Wage Fierce Battle on State Ballot, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2004,
available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-123718964.html.
70. Amendment 3 states:
In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to
receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the
claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment,
settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants. The claimant is
entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and
customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants. This provision is selfexecuting and does not require implementing legislation.
FLA. CONT. art I, § 26.
71. Eric S. Matthew, A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the “Medical
Malpractice” Amendments Reveals Potential Cures for Florida’s Ailing Citizen Initiative Process,
14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 331, 350-351 (2006). The Florida Medical Association was dissatisfied
with the caps on noneconomic damages it achieved in 2003 and decided to ask voters to place a
drastic cap on contingency fees for plaintiff lawyers in malpractice cases. Fla. Physicians, Plaintiffs
Lawyers Battle Over Med-Mal Discovery, INJURYBOARD.COM (Oct. 28, 2005, 10:56 AM),
http://orlando.injuryboard.com/medical-malpractice/fla-physicians-plaintiffs-lawyers-battle-overmed-mal-discovery.aspx?googleid=200192.
When the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers
counterattacked with Amendment 7, hospitals, businesses, and insurance groups tried
unsuccessfully to convince the Florida Medical Association doctors to drop their initiative in
exchange for getting the plaintiffs lawyers to drop their initiative. Id.
72. Floridians for Patient Protection was affiliated with the Academy of Florida Trail
Lawyers and the Florida Lawyers Action Group. Sawran & Weill, supra note 45, at n. 3.
73. Laura V. Yaeger, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has
Florida’s Peer Review Privilege Vanished, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 123, 127 (2009). Interest
in Amendment 7 was heightened due to Amendment 3, which passed in 2004 and severely restricted
attorney contingency fees in malpractice suits. See Mary Coombs, How Not to do Medical
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the Florida electorate on November 2, 2004 with over eighty-one percent
of affirmative votes. 74 Amendment 7’s passage came to symbolize the
public’s long-standing frustration over a perceived “protect our own”
mentality that shielded from public scrutiny even the most dangerous
doctors and hospitals. 75
Amendment 7 states that “patients have a right to access any
records made or received in the course of business by a health care
facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.”76
Amendment 7 significantly eroded longstanding privileges and
immunities surrounding Florida’s peer review, credentialing,
investigations, quality assurance, and risk assessments as they applied to
hospitals. 77 For example, courts found that Florida Statutes, Sections
395.0191(8) and 766.101(5), once utilized to protect medical peer
review records, were preempted by Amendment 7. 78 By granting access
Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 373, 386 (2008).
74. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. As an indication of Amendment 7’s popularity,
5,849,125 citizens voted for it, while only 1,358,183 voted against it. Id.
75. Harris, supra note 69, at 20 (“In the public’s view, allowing the medical profession to
continue to monitor itself, while hiding behind the veil of secrecy, had over time become like the
proverbial fox guarding the hen house.”).
76. FLA. CONST. art. X, §25. The statute provides that the following terms have the
following meaning:
(1) The phrases “health care facility” and “health care provider” have the meaning given
in general law related to a patient’s rights and responsibilities.
(2) The term “patient” means an individual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing, or
has undergone care or treatment in a health care facility or by a health care provider.
(3) The phrase “adverse medical incident” means medical negligence, intentional
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care
provider that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient, including, but
not limited to, those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be reported to
any governmental agency or body, and incidents that are reported to or reviewed by any
health care facility peer review, risk management, quality assurance, credentials, or
similar committee, or any representative of any such committees.
(4) The phrase “have access to any records” means, in addition to any other procedure
for producing such records provided by general law, making the records available for
inspection and copying upon formal or informal request by the patient or a representative
of the patient, provided that current records which have been made publicly available by
publication or on the Internet may be “provided” by reference to the location at which
the records are publicly available.
Id. (cited in Florida Eye Clinic, P.A. v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 1044, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
77. Harris, supra note 69, at 20. The rationale for such protections had been that by ensuring
full, frank, and open peer review and self-evaluation, the quality of patient care improves. Holly v.
Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1984); see also Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
78. See West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr. Inc. v. See, No. SC09–1997, 2012 WL 87282 (Fla. Jan.
12, 2012) (finding that even if the document in question is considered to be within the protections of
sections 766.101(5) and 395.0191(8), Amendment 7 mandates its disclosure because the document
is a record of an adverse medical incident). Here, a blank application form upon which information
was placed to generate a medical staff application was an adverse medical incident record because it
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to such documents, not only were hospitals exposed to new potential
liabilities and increased financial burdens, but peer review in Florida
was changed forever by new disincentives for both hospitals and its peer
review committee members. 79
Evidently concerned by the initiative’s outcome, which essentially
allowed Amendment 7 implementation to bypass all three branches of
government, Florida’s legislature passed an enabling statute (“Enabling
Statute”) 80 during the 2005 regular sessions which restricted
Amendment 7. 81 Many argue that the legislature’s response was a clear
statement they believed the pendulum had swung too far and that the
benefit to current and future patients of having easy access to adverse
medical incident information is attenuated, while the harmful effect on
physicians’ willingness to participate in peer review is far more direct. 82
“Metaphorically speaking, the electorate inadvertently supported
Amendment 7 which treats the disease (tort reform hindering plaintiff
attorneys) instead of the patient (health care as a whole).”83
was pertinent to the process and procedure that led to the alleged negligent grant of medical staff
privileges. Id.
79. Yaeger, supra note 73, at 148 (predicting the potential costs involved in responding to
Amendment 7 document requests will be enormous with hospitals unequipped with the staff to
respond timely).
80. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §381.028 (West 2013). Significantly, § 381.028(6)(a) and (b)
provided that Amendment 7 neither repealed restrictions on the admissibility of records to adverse
medical incidents, nor made them discoverable or admissible into evidence for any purpose,
including impeachment, in any civil or administrative action against a health care facility or health
care provider. Id. The intent of these provisions was to keep intact the long standing privileges and
immunities surrounding peer review, credentialing, investigations of adverse medical incidents,
quality assurance, and risk assessment set forth under § §395.0191, 395.0193, 395.0197, 766.101,
and 766.1016, the very statutes Amendment 7 aimed to modernize. See Florida Hosp. Waterman,
Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008)).
81. Matthew, supra note 71, at 332.
82. Coombs, supra note 73, at 424. “Perhaps the most lacking element of the Florida
initiative process is that no law requires disseminating information about potential long-term
ancillary effects of passing individual or multiple initiative . . . . Unfortunately, most citizens were
unaware of the potential downsides of enacting these initiatives . . .” Matthew, supra note 71, at
346. See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (1984) (noting the court’s assumption that the
legislature balanced the potential benefit to providing broad disclosure of evidence against the
potential for health care cost containment offered by effective self-regulation, finding the latter to be
of greater weight; this careful balancing is exactly the kind of policy judgment which is exclusively
the responsibility of the legislature rather than the courts). The Holly court’s statement furthers the
argument against Florida’s citizen initiative process which allows laws to bypass all branches of
government and the requisite policy judgment checks and balances. See Matthew, supra note 71, at
332.
83. Matthew, supra note 71, at 350-351. While on its surface Amendment 7 helps patients
acquire important information, the fact that Amendment 7 advocates so easily downplayed the
obvious importance of privilege in the medical setting demonstrates the shortcomings of Florida’s
initiative process. Id. at 351. As one author states:
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A frenzy of litigation followed the Enabling Statute that resulted in
conflicting and opposing outcomes. 84 In March 2008, in Florida
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, (“Buster II”), 85 which was appealed
from a Florida District Court, (“Buster III”), 86 the Florida Supreme
Court weighed in and invalidated several provisions of the Enabling
Statute, finding that they were in conflict with Amendment 7. 87
Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court held that Amendment 7 was
self-executing, applied retroactively to existing records and its
retroactive application does not violate a hospital’s due process rights.88
The ancillary effects of the medical malpractice amendments reveal that Florida’s citizen
initiative process is in a quandary: special interest groups propose self-serving
amendments; initiatives are presented to Florida voters without sufficient deliberation;
the summarizing text of an initiative can understate its wide-ranging socioeconomic
effects; there is no substantive review of the initiatives.
Id. at 351.
84. Yaeger, supra note 73, at 132. The divergent outcomes included several Florida court
cases including the following decisions: Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So. 2d 344
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Buster I”) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing); Notami Hosp.
of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that Amendment 7 is selfexecuting, applies retroactively, and that the statute purporting to implement Amendment 7 is
unconstitutional); Bayfront Med. Ctr. v. Neavins, 920 So.2d 185, 186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari as mooted by passage of the Patients’ Right-toKnow About Adverse Medical Incidents Act); Rusiecki v. Jackson-Curtis, No. 03-008570-CI-21,
2005 WL 408133, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2005) (holding that holding that Amendment 7 was
not self-executing and cannot be applied retroactively to impair vested privacy and privilege rights);
Richardson v. Nath, No. 04-006970-01-21, 2005 WL 408132, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2005)
(holding that Amendment 7 was not self-executing and cannot be retroactively applied to impair the
hospital’s vested rights).
85. 984 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2008).
86. 932 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5d D.C.A. 2006)
87. Id.
88. Id. at 481. In concluding that Amendment 7 is self-executing, the Buster II Court applied
the standard set forth in Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960), stating that a constitutional
provision should be self-executing if it “lays down a sufficient rule by means of which the right or
purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may be determined, enjoyed, or protected
without the aid of legislative enactment.” Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 485. Applying Gray’s standard,
the Buster II Court held that Amendment 7 provides a sufficient rule by which patients can gain
access to records of a health care provider’s adverse medical incidents. Id. at 486. The court
supports its conclusion by stating that Amendment 7 expressly declares that it will be effective on
passage, indicating that its effectiveness in overriding prior statutory law was not to be dependent
upon the enactment of implementing legislation. Id.
In deciding that Amendment 7 applied retroactively, the Buster II Court relied on its two-prong
analysis articulated in Metro. Dade Cnty v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999).
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 487. The first prong analyzes whether there is clear legislative intent to
apply the statute retroactively, and the second prong focuses on whether retroactive application is
constitutionally permissible. Buster II, 948 So. 2d at 486-487 (citing Chase Fed., 737 So. 2d at
499). Buster II focused on the plain language of the Amendment to satisfy the first prong, and
concluded that the guarantee of confidentiality previously afforded adverse medical incident reports
and peer review committees did not create a vested right, and thus, the retroactive application is not
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Based on this holding several provisions of the Enabling Statute
that limited access to information granted by Amendment 7 were
invalidated. 89 Specifically, the Buster II court identified five conflict
provisions between Amendment 7 and the Enabling Statute, and
concluded the following language should be severed from the statute: (1)
language stating that only final reports were discoverable; (2) language
providing for disclosure of only final reports relating to the same or
substantially similar condition, treatment or diagnosis with that of the
patient requesting access; (3) limitations to produce only those records
generated after November 2, 2004; (4) language stating that that
Amendment 7 will have no effect on existing privilege statutes; and (5)
language providing that patients can only access the records of a facility
or provider in which they are a patient.90 Consequently, Buster II’s
ruling preserved the broad interpretation of Amendment 7, eroding
completely any peer review protections in Florida.91 Hospital insiders
believe that since Amendment 7 passed, meaningful peer review has
come to a screeching halt, stating further that it was already difficult to
get physicians to engage in peer review prior to Amendment 7 and that it
will now be impossible. 92 Physician resistance to peer review
participation appeared warranted as hospitals began to see an influx of
Amendment 7 motions to compel peer review documents after the

unconstitutional. Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 490. The Court then used language from Div. of
Workers’ Comp. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) which read: “to be vested, a
right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an
existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a
demand . . . .” Brevda, 420 So.2d at 891 (cited in Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 491). Based on this
language, the Buster II Court found that the hospital’s claim rests on a mere expectation of the
continuance of the legislative policy of limited access to the proceedings of peer review committees.
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 490. In concluding that Amendment 7 applied to existing records, the
Buster II Court agreed with the succinct analysis from Notami Hosp. which stated:
Here, the plain language of the amendment permits patients to access any record relating
to any adverse medical incident, and defines ‘patient’ to include individuals who had
previously undergone treatment. The use of the word “any” to define the scope of
discoverable records relating to adverse medical incidents, and the broad definition of
‘patient’ to include those who ‘previously’ received treatment expresses a clear intent
that the records subject to disclosure include those created prior to the effective date of
the amendment. The effective date merely sets forth the date patients obtained the right
to receive the records requested. Because the plain language of the amendment
expresses a clear intent that it be applied to include records created prior to its effective
date, doing so is not an unconstitutional retroactive application.
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 487 (quoting Notami Hosp., 927 So. 2d at 145).
89. Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 492.
90. Id. at 492-493.
91. See Yaeger, supra note 73, at 147.
92. Id. at 148 (citing an interview with a member of a Florida hospital’s executive staff).
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Buster II decision. 93
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
A.

Hospitals Search for Amendment 7 Protection

As Florida hospitals scrambled to protect peer review documents, a
primary argument was that the HCQIA serves as a definitive expression
of policy favoring a statutory peer review privilege. 94 Courts arriving at
the opposite conclusion concede that the HCQIA placed importance on
maintaining immunity for participants of the peer review process, but
believe that Congress “spoke loudly with its silence in not including a
privilege against discovery of peer review material in the HCQIA.” 95
Several federal courts recognized the lack of an explicit medical
peer review privilege in the HCQIA and deemed this a policy choice by
Congress. 96 As one federal court in Ohio stated:
Far from creating a broad privilege, Congress, in enacting the HCQIA,
carefully crafted a very specific privilege, applicable to peer review
material submitted to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services]
pursuant to the dictates of the mandatory reporting provisions of that
statute. That is as far as Congress went, and that is as far as this Court
97
should apply the privilege contained therein.

Two Florida court of appeals cases have similarly held that no
federal statutory peer review privilege was created by the HCQIA. West

93. e.g., Florida Hosp. Assoc. v. Viamonte, No. 4:08cv312-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 5101755, at
*2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2008) (finding that the Florida Hospital Association had received 400
demands for information under Amendment 7). Prior to Amendment 7, the Florida Hospital
Association would have refused many of the requests for information and would have been within
their right under Florida statutes to do so. Id. However, post-Amendment 7, they now must either
provide the information against their wishes or risk fine or enforcement action. Id.
94. Bassler, supra note 15, at 703-704. Specifically, advocates point to the way in which
HCQIA alleviates physicians’ fear of participating in peer review by reducing potential liability,
establishing detailed reporting requirements for reporting settlements, judgments and arbitration
awards, and setting forth requirements for peer review immunity. Id.
95. Id. at 704 (quoting United States v. QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97–CV–174, 1998 WL
1756728, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 1998).
96. See, e.g., In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d
386, 391-92 (D. Mass. 2005); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio
2002); Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Mattice v. Mem’l
Hosp. of S. Bend, 203 F.R.D. 381, 386-87 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (concluding that the HCQIA does not
privilege peer review materials and that these materials are therefore discoverable).
97. Nilavar, 210 F.R.D. at 602 (holding that physician peer review privilege was nonexistent
within federal common law, and extensive authority, as well as “reason and experience,” prevented
against adopting it in action).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss3/6

20

Sorg: Meaningful Peer Review
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 6 - SORG (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

6/17/2013 3:03 PM

MEANINGFUL PEER REVIEW

819

Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. See 98 involved a petitioner’s
argument that Amendment 7 violates the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution because it is impliedly preempted by the
federal HCQIA. 99 In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated that in
enacting the HCQIA, Congress did not provide for confidentiality or
privilege of peer review records or communications, but did provide
peer review participants with immunity from liability for damages with
respect to their participation in such actions.100 The court continued by
stating that the HCQIA further provides the following instruction:
Except as specifically provided in this subchapter, nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed as changing the liabilities or immunities
under law or as preempting or overriding any State law which provides
incentives, immunities, or protection for those engaged in a
professional review action that is in addition to or greater than that
101
provided by this subchapter.

The court concluded its analysis that the HCQIA did not preempt
Amendment 7 by stating, “Congress expressly dealt with the issue of
immunity from liability for communications related to peer review and
with the issue of preemption of laws concerning such protections.”102 In
Columbia Hosp. Corp. of South Broward v. Fain, 103 the Florida court of
appeals used a parallel argument to See to reject the hospital
organization’s argument that Amendment 7 is impliedly preempted by
the HCQIA by concluding that “the abolition of peer review discovery
protections is contrary to the Act’s intent to foster ‘effective peer
review.’” 104
98. 18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 1d D.C.A. 2009).
99. Id. at 684.
100. Id. at 685.
101. Id.
102. West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 18 So. 3d at 685. The court continued by
quoting the HCQIA, saying that Congress further expressed the following intent:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner the rights and
remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to seek redress
for any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or care by any
physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity, or as limiting any defenses or
immunities available to any physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity.
Id. at 685-686 (citing 42. U.S.C.A. §11115 (West 2013)). The See court found that Congress again
fell short of addressing the confidentiality or privileged status of records generated in peer review
processes, but did express its intent not to undermine the ability of patients to seek redress for
medical malpractice. See, 18 So. 3d at 686.
103. 16 So. 3d 236, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
104. Id. at 242. Here, the Florida court of appeals uses language from subchapters I and II of
the HCQIA to conclude that under the HCQIA, Florida’s statutes, which had provided greater
protection and incentives by providing discovery protections for peer review proceedings, were
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Impacted significantly because of the absence of explicit protection
for peer review, and despite its legislative history focusing on
encouraging meaningful peer review through appropriate protection, the
HCQIA alone was not enough to defeat Amendment 7.105 Left to
alternate arguments, hospitals unsuccessfully argued for protection under
work-product privilege, 106 impairment of contracts, 107 and that certain
Amendment 7 requests were irrelevant, overbroad and/or unduly
expressly not preempted. Id. HCQIA Subchapter I contains provisions regarding how it is to be
construed with state law and provides: “nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as changing
the liabilities or immunities under law or as preempting . . . any State law which provides
incentives, immunities, or protection for those engaged in a professional review action that is in
addition to or greater than that provided by this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 11115(a) (West 2013).
Subchapter II of the HCQIA provides for limited confidentiality of certain reports which must be
submitted for inclusion in a national database. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11137(b)(1) (West 2013). Fain
contended that the provisions of Subchapter I and II of the HCQIA work in tandem and that peer
review cannot be “effective” if the discovery protections previously afforded by Florida’s statutes
are abrogated by Amendment 7. Fain, 16 So. 3d at 242-243. However, in Buster II, the Florida
Supreme Court made clear that the limited discovery protections previously afforded by Florida’s
statutes were effectively abolished by the passage of Amendment 7. Id. at 243 (citing Buster II, 984
So. 2d at 488-89). ”These discovery protections were not mandated by the HCQIA, and while they
may have contributed to effective peer review in Florida, the people of the State of Florida are not
preempted from abolishing these statutory protections by constitutional amendment.” Fain, 16 So.
3d at 243. The Fain court concluded that Columbia’s disagreement with Amendment 7 is not
sufficient to overcome the presumption of its constitutionality or to demonstrate a departure from
the essential requirements of law. Id.
105. See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
106. See Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Neely ex rel. Neely, 8 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (finding that while records prepared in anticipation of litigation are prepared by clients, at
least in part, to assist lawyers, this line of reasoning was insufficient to override the broad right of
access to adverse medical incident reports guaranteed under Amendment 7 which was intended to
provide a clear path to access medical incident records); Florida Eye Clinic v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d
1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that Amendment 7 supersedes any fact work-product
privilege because Amendment 7 expresses a clear intent that patient have a right to access any
record made or received in the course of business that relates to an adverse medical incident).
Notably, the Gmach court went on to note a distinction between “fact” work-product and “opinion”
work-product, noting that it did not read Amendment 7 as ”evincing an intent from the voters to
eliminate the privilege of opinion work product.” Id. at 1050. Thus, the Gmach court held that
there was a distinction between opinion work-product and fact work-product, bringing to light the
necessity of understanding precisely which documents a medical provider is attempting to shield
using the work-product privilege. Id.
107. See Fain, 16 So. 3d at 236 (holding that Amendment 7 does not violate the Contracts
Clause on the basis that the amendment impaired contracts between the hospital and its doctors
providing for confidentiality of peer review proceedings because the impairment was not severe and
the public’s interest in providing for broad discoverability of adverse medical incident reports met
the constitutional hurdle); West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr v. See, 18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that Amendment 7 does not operate as a substantial impairment of the contractual
relationship between a hospital and its staff by preventing the hospital from honoring confidentiality
provisions in its medical staff bylaws, and therefore, Amendment 7 does not violate the Federal
Contracts Clause; additionally, the plain language of the bylaws expressly limited guarantee of
confidentiality to the extent permitted by law).
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burdensome. 108 Seemingly left without a defense to Amendment 7
motions, Florida hospitals received its strongest defense yet in the form
of new federal legislation.109
B.

Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (“PSQIA”)

Faced with plaintiffs’ attorneys circumventing state laws with
strong peer review protections and other states, like Florida, eroding
away peer review protections, Congress was forced to reconsider the
federal statutory protections afforded peer review to ensure a meaningful
process. 110 Congress responded with the PSQIA, stating in its legislative
history that: “[c]urrently, the State peer review protections are
inadequate to allow the sharing of information to promote patient
safety.” 111 This conclusion was supported with a 1999 Institute of
Medicine (IOM) report, entitled To Err is Human, 112 which estimated
that as many as 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable
medical errors. 113 Differentiating from the HCQIA’s catalyst which
108. See Fain, 16 So. 3d at 240 (holding that a request for Amendment 7 materials is not an
ordinary discovery request that may be subjected to overbreadth, irrelevance, or burdensomeness
objections because pursuant to Amendment 7, a patient has the absolute right to discover records
relating to any adverse medical incident and that right is not conditioned on the discovery being
relevant to a pending claim); Amisub North Ridge Hosp., Inc. v. Sonaglia, 995 So. 2d 999 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that Amendment 7 does not limit the definition of a patient to one
seeking the information for any type of proper purpose; thus Amendment 7 does not require the
information that a patient seeks to be relevant to a pending medical malpractice action or to a
medical care decision); Morton Plant Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Shahbas ex rel. Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that whether a request is overly burdensome is not a relevant
consideration for an Amendment 7 request).
109. See infra notes 111, 118-123 and accompanying text.
110. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note
28, at *9 (discussing the PSQIA’s broad approval of the medical peer review process and more
sweeping evidentiary protections that are now afforded peer review individuals and documents).
111. S. REP. NO. 109-544, at 3 (2005).
112. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST, OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN:
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et. al. eds., 2000).
113. Id. “The report emphasizes the need to make system improvements and advises that
health care information reporting systems must develop and implement processes through which
medical error information can be identified, analyzed and utilized to prevent further medical
errors.” S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003) (discussing To Err Is Human, supra note 112)).
Unfortunately, society’s long-standing reliance on the threat of malpractice litigation discourages
health care professionals and organizations from disclosing, sharing, and discussing information
about medical errors. S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003). Unlike civil actions, the IOM’s systemsbased approach focuses on prospective systematic safety remedies, rather than on retrospectively
applying blame, thus working to prevent future error. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra
note 16, at 399.
In To Err is Human and subsequent reports, the IOM recommends a tiered approach to
improve the quality of care: federal protections for a voluntary error reporting system
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focused on the need “to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to
move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the
physician’s previous damaging or incompetent performance,”114 the
PSQIA addressed the broader problem of systematic failures in the
delivery of health care that resulted in preventable adverse events.
Specifically, the PSQIA stated, “One of the main conclusions was that
the majority of medical errors do not result from individual recklessness
or the actions of a particular group; rather, most errors are caused by
faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead people to make
mistakes or fail to prevent adverse events.” 115
In a 2003 report on the PSQIA, the Senate declared its intent to
remedy this situation by “promoting a learning environment . . . to move
beyond the existing culture of blame and punishment . . . to a ‘culture of
safety’ that focuses on . . . the prevention of future medical errors” in an
effort to increase patient safety. 116 With its mission clear, on July 29,
2005, the PSQIA was signed into law. 117
(which is the focus of this bill); a narrowly focused mandatory reporting system to
collect standardized information by State governments about adverse events that result in
death or serious harm . . . increased investment in information technology; establishing a
national focus to create leadership and enhance the knowledge base about safety; raising
standards and expectations for improvements in safety; and creating safety systems
inside health care organizations through the implementation of safe practices at the
delivery level. Enactment of [the PSQIA] is a significant step in an ongoing effort to
improve the quality of care provided to all Americans.
S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003).
114. KD ex. rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp. 2d 587, 595 (2010) (citing 42
U.S.C.A. § 11101(2) (West 2013)).
115. Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595 (quoting Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73
Fed. Reg. 8112, 8112-13 (Feb. 12, 2008)). Dieffenbach also quoted the same PSQIA Federal
Register content by citing that:
Much of the impetus for this legislation can be traced to the publication of the landmark
report, ‘To Err is Human,’ by the Institute of Medicine in 1999 [which] cited studies that
found that at least 44,000 people and potentially as many as 98,000 people die in U.S.
hospitals each year as a result of preventable medical errors. Based on these studies and
others, the Report estimated that the total national costs of preventable adverse
events . . . to be between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care costs represent
one-half.
Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595 (quoting Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg.
8112, 8112-13 (Feb. 12, 2008)).
116. Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 595 (quoting S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003).
117. Patient and Safety Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424
(2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2013)). In remarks made at the time the PSQIA
was signed into law, President George W. Bush stated that the PSQIA is a “commonsense law”
designed to allow others to learn from the collective experiences of physicians and nurses by
protecting providers who report critical patient safety information. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli &
Howard, supra note 16, at 407 (citing Remarks on Signing the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1227 (July 29, 2005)).
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In short, the PSQIA guarantees confidentiality and provides a
privilege to patient safety work product (“PSWP”) that is voluntarily
submitted to a patient safety organization (“PSO”).118 The PSQIA was
drafted “to ensure that this legislation strikes the appropriate balance
between plaintiff rights and creating a new culture in the health care
industry that provides incentives to identify and learn from errors.”119
The PSQIA extends state peer review protections to patient safety and
quality improvement materials that are collected and analyzed by
hospitals for internal use or shared for the purposes of improving patient
safety and quality of care. 120
Testimony received by Congress made it clear that a “safe harbor”
must be created for the reporting of medical error information, or no
provider would gather and report such data because the risk of liability
was too great. 121 Thus, while the PSQIA fails to mention peer review
explicitly, its extensive discussion of broad federal protection in its
legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended that the PSQIA
protect the peer review process. 122
118. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22 (West 2013).
119. S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 3 (2003). This Senate Report stated that the PSQIA recognizes
that patient safety can best be improved by fostering efforts to identify and fix errors while ensuring
that providers remain accountable. Id.
120. Id. at 2. The PSQIA privilege encompasses not only the report to the PSO but also:
[A]ll aspects of the analysis of, and subsequent corrective actions related to, adverse
events, medical errors, and ‘near misses’ reported as patient safety data. It covers all
deliberations, including oral and written communications, and work products that meet
the requirements for patient safety data. This legislation also establishes confidentiality
protections for this written and oral patient safety data to promote the reporting of
medical errors. As a result, health care providers will be able to report and analyze
medical errors, without fear that these reports will become public or be used in litigation.
This nonpunitive environment will foster the sharing of medical error information that is
a significant step in a process to improve the safety, quality, and outcomes of medical
care.
Id. at 4. See also Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595-96.
121. S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 1 (2003). While the PSQIA’s confidentiality and privilege
protections are broad, limited disclosures are allowed under certain conditions. Levy, Mareniss,
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 412. The most significant exception involves the disclosure
of patient PSWP during criminal proceedings. Id. PSWP may be disclosed if the court determines
that the information contains material evidence that cannot be reasonably obtained from another
source. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(1)(A) (West 2013)). Disclosures are also permitted to
law enforcement officials if a provider reasonably believes PSWP is necessary to facilitate criminal
law enforcement activity and between authorized entities. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(2)(G); 42
U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(2).
122. See Kathryn Leaman, Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA may
Provide Federal Privilege and Confidentiality Protections to the medical Peer Review Process, 11
MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 177, 193 (2007). “[A] possible benefit from omitting the term ‘peer
review’ from the [PSQIA] is that it allowed Congress to expand the class of activities generating
protected patient safety information beyond the limited scope of peer review.” Levy, Mareniss,
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In lieu of the PSQIA, Amendment 7 is ripe for a new round of
litigation, with the statutory privilege created by the PSQIA serving as a
potential precursor to a supplementary common law peer review
privilege. 123
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Framework of the PSQIA

Understanding the practical impact of PSQIA implementation
begins with understanding the mechanics behind the law. The PSQIA
provides federal privilege and confidentiality protection to PSWP 124 that
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 414.
123. See, e.g., Complaint, Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. Guillermo et al., No. 2:10-cv-00700,
2011 WL 5826672 (Nov. 18, 2011) (2:10-cv-00700-CEH-DNF), 2010 WL 5809357 (arguing that
Amendment 7 is preempted by the PSQIA).
124. The PSQIA defines “patient safety work product” as:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “patient safety work product” means
any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written
or oral statements—
(i) which—
(I) are assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a patient safety
organization and are reported to a patient safety organization; or
(II) are developed by a patient safety organization for the conduct of patient safety
activities;
and which could result in improved patient safety, health care quality, or health care
outcomes; or
(ii) which identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of, or identify the fact of
reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system.
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(7)(a) (West 2013).
The PSQIA expressly clarifies that definition, such that:
(i) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include a patient’s medical
record, billing and discharge information, or any other original patient or provider
record.
(ii) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include information that is
collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately, from a patient safety
evaluation system. Such separate information or a copy thereof reported to a patient
safety organization shall not by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety work
product.
(iii) Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit—
(I) the discovery of or admissibility of information described in this subparagraph
in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding;
(II) the reporting of information described in this subparagraph to a Federal, State,
or local governmental agency for public health surveillance, investigation, or other
public health purposes or health oversight purposes; or
(III) a provider’s recordkeeping obligation with respect to information described in
this subparagraph under Federal, State, or local law.
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(7)(b).
Congress indicated that not all traditional healthcare operations, record keeping
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is assembled for reporting to a PSO 125 within a patient safety evaluation
system (“PSES”). 126 Because the reporting of medical errors is
voluntary under the PSQIA, the legal protections that are provided to
hospitals act as an incentive to encourage reporting. 127 PSOs are
organizations that collect and analyze PSWP. 128 Once the PSO collects
documents, or communications fall under the patient safety work product definition . . . .
The key distinction between the traditional healthcare operations that Congress intended
to exclude and the peer review process is that peer review materials submitted to the
PSO as patient safety work product originated from the peer review process itself, rather
than from the actual delivery of healthcare . . . . Therefore, anything created during the
peer review process by relying on non-patient safety work product, such as medical
records, physician notes, operations logs, billing records, records of drug deliveries, et.
falls under the patient safety work product definition and the protections granted by the
PSQIA because it does not originate during initial healthcare delivery.
Leaman, supra note 122, at 191-192.
125. A PSO is defined in the PSQIA as: “a private or public entity or component thereof that
is listed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services pursuant to section 299b-24(d) of this title.”
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(4). The PSQIA requires the Secretary to compile and maintain a listing of
entities with respect to which there is an acceptance of a certification as a PSO. 42 U.S.C.A. §
299b-24(d) (West 2013). The process for certification and listings of PSOs is implemented and
overseen by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”), while compliance with the
confidentiality provisions is handled by the Office of Civil Rights. Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008). This PSO listing can be found
online at: Listed Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND
QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/psolist.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).
126. The term “patient safety evaluation system” means the collection, management, or
analysis of information for reporting to or by a patient safety organization. 42 U.S.C.A. §299b21(6). Documentation of PSES clearly establishes when information is PSWP, thus although
healthcare organization are not required to document its PSES, the Department of Health and
Human Services highly encourages it. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed.
Reg. 70732, 70738-70739 (Nov. 21, 2008). PSES is defined by reference to “patient safety
activities,” which include:
(1) efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of health care delivery; (2) the
collection and analysis of patient safety work product; (3) the development and
dissemination of information regarding patient safety, such as recommendations,
protocols or information regarding best practices; (4) the utilization of patient safety
work product for the purposes of encouraging a culture of safety, as well as providing
feedback and assistance to effectively minimize patient risk; (5) the maintenance of
procedures to preserve confidentiality with respect to patient safety work product; (6) the
provision of appropriate security measures with respect to patient safety work product;
(7) the utilization of qualified staff; and (8) activities related to the operation of a patient
safety evaluation system and to the provision of feedback to participants in a patient
safety evaluation system.
David S. Ivill & Amy Hooper Kearbey, The Rise of Patient Safety Organizations: Reports and
Sharing without Fear of Liability, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 2, 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §299b-21(5); Patient
Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732, 70798 (Nov. 21, 2008) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. §3.20)).
127. Bell, supra note 18, at 747.
128. KD ex. rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 587, 596 (D. Del. 2010) (citing
S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 5 (2003).
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PSWP, it evaluates the documented medical errors and recommends
ways that the hospital can prevent similar medical errors from happening
again, thus improving patient safety and quality of care. 129 The
hospital’s PSES must promptly submit PSWP to the hospital’s PSO
because PSQIA privilege will not apply if the PSO fails to receive the
PSWP. 130
With limited exceptions,131 to encourage PSWP reporting and
create a non-punitive environment for evaluating medical errors, the
PSQIA provides that PSWP shall be privileged and confidential:
(a) Privilege: Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, and subject to subsection (c) . . . patient safety work product
shall be privileged and shall not be - (1) subject to a Federal, State, or
local civil, criminal, or administrative subpoena or order, including in a
Federal, State, or local civil or administrative disciplinary proceeding
against a provider; (2) subject to discovery in connection with a
Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding,
including in a Federal, State, or local civil or administrative
disciplinary proceeding against a provider; (3) subject to disclosure
pursuant to section 552 of title 5, (commonly known as the Freedom of
Information Act) or any other similar Federal, State, or local law; (4)
admitted as evidence in any Federal, State, or local governmental civil
proceeding, criminal proceeding, administrative rulemaking
proceeding, or administrative adjudicatory proceeding, including any
such proceeding against a provider; or (5) admitted in a professional
disciplinary proceeding of a professional disciplinary body established
or specifically authorized under State law.
(b) Confidentiality of patient safety work product: Notwithstanding
any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, and subject to
subsection (c) of this section, patient safety work product shall be
132
confidential and shall not be disclosed.

129. Leaman, supra note 122, at 185-186. PSOs, in turn, voluntarily report non-identifiable
PSWP to AHRQ which maintains a network of databases to analyze PSWP reporting. Id. at 186.
130. See S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 7 (2003) (emphasizing that while the PSQIA remains silent
on the required reporting timeframe, hospitals must report patient safety work product to the PSO
within two months from the time the event being evaluated occurred to be eligible for PSQIA
protections).
131. 42 U.S.C.A. §299b-22(a)(3) (West 2013) (noting that PSQIA privilege and
confidentiality protections do not apply to disclosures made in criminal proceedings, disclosures
that are expressly permitted, non-identifiable disclosures, disclosures to the Food and Drug
Administration, or any other exceptions that the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
determines at a later date).
132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(a)-(b). Patient safety information can become PSWP through
three distinct paths: (1) information created for and reported to a PSO; (2) information and analysis
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On January 11, 2009, the Department of Health and Human
Services promulgated regulations implementing the PSQIA. 133 The
protections afforded by the PSQIA enable all hospitals and health care
providers to share data within a protected legal environment without the
threat that the information will be used against it.134 The result of the
PSQIA is a statutory solution that encourages meaningful peer review
and improved quality of care, while also serving as the impetus to an
expanded federal common law peer review privilege. 135
B.

The PSQIA Statutory Privilege and Impact on Amendment 7

The PSQIA creates federal statutory privilege and confidentiality
protections that shield providers from the unauthorized use and
disclosure of specific quality and safety information as described
above. 136 The PSQIA comprehensively addresses the following three
problems in the state peer review protection system: “(1) it creates a
uniform national system of protections that protects a wide array of
health care institutions; (2) it encourages sharing information with other
parties; and (3) it cannot be avoided by filing a claim in federal court.”137
generated by a PSO in the process of generating patient safety activities; and (3) documentation of
deliberations or analysis of, or the fact of reporting pursuant to, a PSES. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli
& Howard, supra note 16, at 409. The language of the PSQIA continues by stating that:
Nothing in this section shall be construed—(1) to limit the application of other Federal,
State, or local laws that provide greater privilege or confidentiality protections than the
privilege and confidentiality protections provided for in this section; (2) to limit, alter, or
affect the requirements of Federal, State, or local law pertaining to information that is
not privileged or confidential under this section; (3) except as provided in subsection (i)
of this section, to alter or affect the implementations of any provision of the HIPAA
confidentiality regulations or section 1320d-5 of this title (or regulations promulgated
under such section); (4) to limit the authority of any provider, patient safety organization,
or other entity to enter into a contract requiring greater confidentiality or delegating
authority to make a disclosure or use in accordance with this section; (5) as preempting
or otherwise affecting any State law requiring a provider to report information that is not
patient safety work product; or (6) to limit, alter, or affect any requirement for reporting
to the Food and Drug Administration information regarding the safety of a product or
activity regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.
42 U.S.C.A. §299b-22(g).
133. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008)
(codified at 42 C.F.R. part 3). The summary of the final rules states that the PSQIA “establishes a
framework by which hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers may voluntarily report
information to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), on a privileged and confidential basis, for the
aggregation and analysis of patient safety events.” Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 414.
137. Id. at 415. Prior to the PSQIA, the lack of federal peer review privilege enabled
plaintiffs’ attorneys to circumvent state peer review protections by joining a state claim to a federal
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Federal courts have recognized that the PSQIA created tightly crafted
federal privilege and confidentiality protection for PSWP. 138 In doing
so, the PSQIA expressly preempts any state law or constitutional
provision that is contrary to its provisions, including Amendment 7. 139
Almost all patient safety information reported by hospitals to PSOs
will come from traditional peer review activities, meaning PSQIA
protection will shield traditional peer review activities within
hospitals. 140 Thus, Florida hospitals that report peer review materials
appropriately through a PSO will attain protection for the type of
documents that Amendment 7 desired to make discoverable.
Consequently, as Florida courts continue to identify peer review
documents as public records, more and more hospitals are partnering
with PSOs and following the PSQIA’s statutory framework to protect
these documents. 141 From a practical perspective, many Florida
plaintiffs’ attorneys and PSQIA critics opine that hospitals are only
partnering with PSOs in order to block the public from peer review
materials. 142 While it is too early to have aggregate data on what the

claim filed in federal court. Id. at 404. This procedural strategy was employed in Burrows v.
Redbud Community Hospital, 187 F.R.D. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1998), when the parents of an elevenmonth-old boy, who died after being transferred from the emergency department at Redbud
Community Hospital to another hospital ninety minutes away, filed an EMTALA action in federal
court that included state claims of wrongful death and medical malpractice. Levy, Mareniss,
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 404 (citing Redbud Cmty. Hosp. v. Burrows, 188 F.R.D. 356,
358 (N.D Cal. 1997)). When the parents sought discovery of peer review documents related to the
attending physician’s decision to transfer, the hospital refused to disclose the information citing
California’s peer review statute for support. Redbud, 187 F.R.D. at 612. In an unpublished opinion,
the Northern District of California determined that California’s peer review statute did not apply in
this matter because the EMTALA action raised a federal question, and under federal law at the time,
there was no protection or these materials. Id. (discussed in Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard,
supra note 16, at 404).
138. Lee Med. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 534-35 (Tenn. 2010). The court stated that the
Institute of Medicine’s 2000 report prompted additional congressional debate over medical error
and provided momentum that served as a catalyst for Congress to enact the PSQIA. Id.
139. See PSQIA privilege and confidentiality language supra note 132 and accompanying text.
See also Fancher v. Shields, No. 10-CI-4219 (Jefferson Cir. Ct, Ky. Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that
there is a clear statement of a Congressional intent that such patient safety communications be
protected in order to foster openness in the interest of improved patient safety, and thus, the area has
been preempted by the federal law).
140. Bell, supra note 18, at 772.
141. Christine Jordan Sexton, Fighting to Keep Peer Review Private, FLA. MED. BUS., July
2009, at 6. The author states that because the PSQIA trumps Florida state law and the Buster II
ruling, and because PSOs are specifically designed to allow doctors to share information about
medical errors without fear of legal discovery, she sees PSOs building momentum in Florida. Id.
142. Id. The author quotes medical malpractice attorney Sean Cronin who says, “I’m
concerned that [hospitals] are setting up legal entities [in the form of PSOs] for the sole purpose of
keeping information from the public.” Id.
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PSQIA has meant to peer review in Florida, the fact that Florida has
more listed PSOs than any other state suggests that Florida hospitals
recognize the statutory framework of the PSQIA as a means to reintroduce meaningful peer review in an effort to improve patient safety
and quality of care. 143
C.

Overview of Common Law Privilege

While the PSQIA’s federal statutory protection cloaks qualified
peer review activities with privilege and confidentiality protection, it
falls short of protecting peer review activities that fail to satisfy its
statutory requirements. 144 In these instances, protection depends on
federal common law principles.145 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(1), information that is not privileged is discoverable if
relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.146
Assuming a federal question exists, “Federal Rules of Evidence 501
directs that . . . privileges ‘shall be governed by the principles of
143. Florida leads the nation in the number of PSOs, with eight listed on AHRQ’s webpage.
In total, seventy-seven PSOs in thirty states and the District of Columbia are currently listed by
AHRQ. Geographical Director of Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/geolist.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).
As an example, Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC (“MPRR”) is a listed PSO in the state of
Florida. Id. Although a national PSO, MPRR’s website has a section devoted to its “Florida Focus”
which reads:
Due to the fast growth and interest in the need to improve quality, by finding a way to
protect peer review, we are particularly working with Florida healthcare providers who
face a unique issue, Amendment 7, also known as the Patient’s Right to Know
Amendment. Amendment 7 raises a serious challenge for Florida hospitals and
physicians, as previously protected peer review information is subject to greater
discovery in litigation. Amendment 7 confers broad rights to obtain records of adverse
medical incidents. MPRRs efforts focus on how hospitals and physicians can protect
this information through our PSO, as instituted by the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA).
Florida Focus, MED. PEER REVIEW RES., LLC, http://medicalpeerreviewresource.com/florida.php
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
144. See, e.g., Schlegel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, No. CIV 07-0520 MCE KJM, 2008
WL 4570619 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008) (declining to afford PSQIA federal statutory protection
when there was no indication that the applicable investigations conducted were prepared for and
reported to a PSO); Massi v. Walgreen Co., No. 3:05-CV-425, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77893, at
*14-16 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2006) (recognizing the federal privilege, but ruling that there was
inadequate showing by the defendant that the information was assembled for purposes of reporting
to a PSO).
145. See, e.g., Schlegel, 2008 WL 4570619, at *3; Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ.
4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at *6 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011); K.D. ex rel. Dieffenbach v.
United States, 715 F. Supp.2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010).
146. Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 591. Generally, any party asserting privilege bears the
responsibility of proving the availability of privilege and its applicability. Id.
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common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in light of reason and experience.’” 147 This rule is intended to
afford district courts the “flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a
case-by-case basis.” 148
The United States Supreme Court decision in Jaffee v. Redmond 149
established the psychotherapist—patient privilege as the most recently
recognized federal privilege. 150 Here, the Jaffee Court concluded that
the “reason and experience” clause of Federal Evidence Rule 501
required the psychotherapist–patient privilege be recognized.151
Articulating its rationale, the Court stated that: “Reason tells us that
psychotherapists and patients share a unique relationship in which the
ability to communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure is the
key to successful treatment.” 152 The court continued, stating that “in the
absence of absolute confidentiality, the practice of psychotherapeutic
counseling would fail to serve the purpose it is intended for: the
treatment of patients.” 153 Here, it was determined that the sheer
possibility of disclosure may impede the development of trust and
confidence essential to successful treatment.154
In satisfying the “experience” prong, Jaffee noted that all fifty
states had adopted some form of psychotherapist—patient privilege. 155
Stating that “it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy
determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both ‘reason’ and
‘experience,’” the Jaffee Court concluded the vast recognition of
psychotherapist-patient privilege by state legislatures evidenced

147. Id. at 591 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501); see also Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege)).
148. Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189
(1990)).
149. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
150. Id. at 1. In Jaffe, the defendant police officer shot the decedent when the officer believed
the decedent was about to stab another man. Id. Post-incident, the defendant sought counseling.
Id. Survivors of the decedent brought a federal suit claiming the decedent’s constitutional rights
were violated because the officer allegedly used excessive force during the encounter. Id. at 5. The
privilege issue focused on whether the plaintiffs were able to obtain notes and statements taken by
the officer’s therapist during counseling sessions, or whether the statements and notes were
protected from compelled disclosure by recognition of a new federal common law psychotherapistpatient privilege. Id. at 5.
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id. at 6.
153. Bassler, supra note 15, at 708 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10).
154. Bassler, supra note 15, at 708 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10). Here, the author compares
the importance of privilege in the psychotherapist-patient relationship to the importance of privilege
in a successful attorney-client relationship. Bassler, supra note 15, at 708.
155. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2
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overwhelming support for expanding the privilege. 156 Further, the Court
noted that a uniform recognition of the privilege is important because the
participants in the confidential conversation must be able to predict with
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be
protected; noting that an uncertain privilege is little better than no
privilege at all. 157
D.

An Expanded Peer Review Privilege in Federal Court

Federal courts have recognized that medical peer review privilege
furthers federal policy. 158 Historically, however, courts have declined to
recognize a medical peer review privilege for two primary reasons:
reliance on an inapplicable United States Supreme Court ruling 159 and
Congress’ failure to create a medical peer review privilege when it
enacted the HCQIA. 160
Focusing on the second rationale, as the Court in KD ex rel.
Dieffenbach v. U.S 161 correctly recognized, the HCQIA no longer
represents Congress’ final word on medical peer review protection.162 In
156. Id. at 14.
157. Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 101 S. Ct. 677, 684 (1923) (“An uncertain privilege, or
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little
better than no privilege at all.”).
158. See, e.g., Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at
*6 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011) (articulating the primary purpose of privilege is to encourage candor
among medical staff by shielding the information from disclosure in medical malpractice suits).
159. See Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (holding common-law privilege
would not be recognized to protect peer review materials from disclosure and insisting that courts
narrowly construe statutes providing privileges). This case, however, pertained to a professor’s
tenure peer review file in an employment discrimination action and does not, and should not, extend
to peer review documents in medical malpractice actions. Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6. “The
interests at issue in a discrimination claim . . . are different from [those] of a medical malpractice
case, and merit a different analysis.” Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007).
“Moreover, recognizing a medical peer review privilege in a civil rights case would not further the
primary purpose of such a privilege: ‘to encourage candor among medical staff by shielding the
information from disclosure in medical malpractice suits.’” Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6
(quoting Singh v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:09-0439, 2010 WL 2521039, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 15,
2010)).
160. See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2001) (relying heavily on
the fact that the legislative history of the HCQIA was silent as to whether Congress considered and
rejected a federal privilege the court concluded that Congress will create a peer review privilege
when it is so inclined and did not do so in the HCQIA); Agster v. Maricopa Cnty, 422 F.3d 836, 839
(9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that Congress had occasion and opportunity to consider the privilege
and decided not to grant it either explicitly or by implication; therefore the court found a general
objection for providing a privilege itself).
161. 715 F.Supp.2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010).
162. Id. (cited in Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6). Differentiating the PSQIA and HCQIA
further, unlike HCQIA’s legislative history, “the PSQIA’s legislative history contains frequent
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its analysis, Dieffenbach stated that the PSQIA “announces a more
general approval of the medical peer review process and more sweeping
evidentiary protections for materials used therein.” 163
Furthermore, because the PSQIA promoted a learning environment
intended to create a “culture of safety” that focuses on information
sharing, improved patient safety and quality and the prevention of future
medical care, the Dieffenbach court felt its decision to recognize a
qualified privilege for confidential and evaluative materials produced in
the applicable review process was aligned with PSQIA’s intent.164
Similarly, in Francis v. United States 165 the court recognized a
privilege for medical peer review materials after stating that “in light of
the broad protection afforded by the PSQIA” the relevant inquiry is
whether medical peer review privilege would advance Congress’ goal of
promoting peer review to improve quality care. 166 Here, the defendant
demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that private and public interests
would be served by recognizing a medical peer review privilege because
“the success of a hospital’s quality assurance review process ‘depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence.’” 167
These two United States District Court decisions demonstrate that
the PSQIA has changed courts’ historical position on medical peer
review privilege and suggests that the United States Supreme Court may

references to expanding peer review protections so that healthcare providers can report medical
errors without fear of being sued.” Leaman, supra note 119, at 195 (citing S. REP. NO. 108-196, at
1-3 (2003) (recognizing that medical errors must be reported, analyzed and corrected in order to
improve patient safety and the quality of healthcare in the United States). While a court may
decline federal peer review confidentiality and privilege protection because Congress failed to
expressly provide for them in the PSQIA’s statutory language, this is unlikely because Congress has
expressly stated that even though the words “peer review” do not appear in the PSQIA, the purpose
of the legislation was to provide peer review protections. Leaman, supra note 122, at 195-196
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-197, at 11(2005) (emphasizing that the PSQIA provides peer review
protection of PSWP reported to a PSO).
163. Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6 (quoting Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 595).
164. Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp.2d at 595. The court’s recognition of a qualified privilege for
confidential evaluative materials produced by the pertinent review process was heavily influenced
by public policy evident in Maryland privilege law and Congress’ intent in passing the PSQIA. Id.
at 592. Although the review body at issue here was not technically a PSO, the court felt it clearly
performed the same functions that Congress intended the PSQIA to encourage such as monitoring,
oversight and performing periodic assessments of data quality. Id. at 596. Because the pertinent
review process collected the same kind of safety data enumerated in the PSQIA, within the same
organizational structure, to accomplish the same goal, the court concluded that it was “confident
that protecting otherwise confidential and evaluative materials resulting from this process would not
substantially offend the federal policy announced in the PSQIA.” Id. at 597.
165. No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011).
166. Id. at *6
167. Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996)).
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consider a new expanded common law medical peer review privilege. 168
E.

The United States Supreme Court Should Provide a Common Law
Privilege to Medical Peer Review

Influenced by the recent United States District Court decisions
referenced above, the United States Supreme Court should establish a
common law peer review privilege. Jaffee provides an analytical
framework that supports extending a federally recognized privilege to
medical peer review.169
First, the absolute confidentiality that the Jaffee Court reasoned was
imperative to establishing successful psychotherapist–patient
relationships, is equally important to encouraging meaningful medical
peer review. 170 The Jaffee Court further opined that without protection,
statements that might have otherwise been relevant to a civil action
would never have been made by the patient, leaving nothing to discover
because of fear that disclosures would not be kept confidential. 171
Likewise, if physicians fear that statements made during the peer review
process are discoverable, it is unlikely that they will participate in peer
review. 172 If physicians do not participate in peer review, the ability to
accomplish Congress’ goals of significantly reducing medical error is
compromised. 173
Second, Jaffee noted that recognizing an expanded privilege may be
appropriate when there is uniform recognition of the privilege among the
states. 174 Dieffenbach and Francis recognized that all fifty States and
168. Michael Cassidy, Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) May Change
Federal Common Law Privilege, TUCKER ARENSBERG ATTORNEYS MED. LAW BLOG (June 14,
2010),
http://www.medlawblog.com/articles/credentialing-and-peer-review/patient-safety-andquality-improvement-act-psqia-may-change-federal-common-law-privilege.
169. See Bassler, supra note 15, at 707.
170. See supra notes 154-154 and accompanying text.
171. See Bassler, supra note 15, at 708. In support of this point, the court stated:
In contrast to the significant public and private interests supporting recognition of the
privilege, the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege
is modest.
If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is
obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably
result in litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which
litigants such as petitioner seek access-for example, admissions against interest by a
party-is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore serve no
greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12.
172. See Bassler, supra note 15, at 711.
173. See supra notes 58, 116, 122 and accompanying text.
174. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12. As the Supreme Court has noted, “any State’s promise of
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the District of Columbia recognize some form of medical peer review
privilege. 175 Such overwhelming state support was an important factor
in satisfying Jaffee’s “experience” test, thus providing support that the
United States Supreme Court will find it appropriate to recognize a
corresponding federal common law medical peer review privilege. 176
Finally, like the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee, both
reason and experience conclude that a medical peer review privilege
promotes sufficiently important interests that overshadow the need for
obtaining evidence.177 This fact is solidified by To Err is Human,
discussed above, which suggests meaningful peer review will help
prevent as many as 98,000 preventable errors annually, resulting in
annual savings of as much as $29 billion in national healthcare costs. 178
In light of its role in improving patient safety and quality of care, the
public interest in promoting peer review continues to be
“overwhelming.” 179
V. CONCLUSION
There is a general recognition and acceptance at both the local and
national level that “(1) meaningful peer review is essential to improving
healthcare outcomes; (2) that meaningful and effective peer review
requires candid participation by physicians; and (3) that physician
participation will be candid only where the details of peer review are
kept confidential and privileged.” 180
confidentiality would have little value if . . . the privilege would not be honored in a federal court.
Denial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was
enacted to foster these confidential communications.” Id. at 13.
175. K.D. ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 587, 592-594 (D. Del. 2010);
Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at *5-6 (S.D. N.Y.
May 31, 2011). “These statutes share a common purpose in encouraging physician candidness by
eliminating the fear that peer review information will be used against them in subsequent litigation.”
Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 594. Although Florida no longer provides peer review protection
after Amendment 7, the “experience” test is further supported in this case because Congress has
explicitly recognized the importance of peer review in the PSQIA. See Bassler, supra note 15, at
711.
176. See Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5-6. Furthermore, while all states provide for certain
peer review protection, subtle differences in the language of each state’s peer review statutes and
the underlying public policy associated with each respective statute have led to varying
interpretations on the scope of state medical peer review protection. Graham, supra note 58, at 138.
177. See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-10; see also supra notes 115-115 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
179. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 28,
at *8 (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc. 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970)
180. Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 28,
at *9. These principles have been recognized in state courts across the country. Id. at *10 (citing as
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The introduction of the PSQIA re-established the foundation for
meaningful peer review by providing federal statutory privilege and
confidentiality protection for peer review materials submitted to a
PSO. 181 Furthermore, multiple federal courts have focused on the intent
of the PSQIA to recognize an expanded federal peer review privilege,
decisions that may help serve as the catalyst for the United States
Supreme Court to consider an expanded federal common law privilege
for medical peer review.182
Although potential plaintiffs may feel a greater burden establishing
medical malpractice claims, the burden is not undue as plaintiffs may
still obtain necessary records and documents from their own medical
records to give rise to appropriate actions.183 In scenarios where
privilege applies, while patients may not have access to adverse medical
incidents when considering which physician choose, the reductions in
medical error presumed associated with peer review protection should
increase the patient’s confidence that treatment will be performed
without error. 184 Therefore, considering the constituents most directly
affected by federal peer review privilege and confidentiality protection,
it appears clear that benefits of protection outweigh the risks. 185 In
addition to quality of care improvements, a uniform federal peer review
privilege would lower transactions costs to hospitals, thereby reducing
patients’ cost of health care, a critical issue in the United States. 186
examples, Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 595 (D. Minn. 1993) (the goal of peer review is
the improvement of patient care); Ardisana v. Northwest Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 795 N.E.2d 964, 969
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (purpose of statute privileging peer review materials is to advance the
quality of health care by ensuring that peer review committee members effectively engage in the
peer-review process); State ex rel. St. Johns Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Dally, 90 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2002) (“Peer review, the process by which physicians and hospitals evaluate and discipline
staff doctors, has become an integral component of the health care system in the United States.”).
181. See supra notes 124-135 and accompanying text.
182. See cases discussed supra notes 159-164.
183. Leaman, supra note 124, at 200-201. PSQIA advocates believe that it strikes an
important balance “because the PSQIA protections will ease peer review participants’ fears of being
sued for honestly evaluating their colleagues, while at the same time giving plaintiffs who wish to
sue for medical malpractice access to the information created at the time of the alleged
malpractice.” Id. at 188. Specifically, the definition of PSWP expressly excludes a patient’s
medical record. See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 90.
184. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
185. Leaman, supra note 122, at 200-201. The author identifies the three primary parties
influenced by PSQIA federal privilege and confidentiality protections as (1) the physicians that
participate in peer review; (2) potential plaintiffs who may bring a medical malpractice action; and
(3) individuals seeking medical care. Id. at 200.
186. Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 90. “Peer review encourages practices that seek
to avoid preventable adverse events in the first place, thereby reducing costs.” Id. at 51.
Additionally, the author argues that a uniform privilege will lead to a uniform body of law which
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In Florida, the effects of the PSQIA will be uniquely felt because of
its impact on Amendment 7. 187 Hospitals are already restructuring
internal processes and partnering with PSOs to obtain the available
statutory PSQIA protections, and a new wave of litigation is now ripe
for hospitals to challenge Amendment 7 requests utilizing a PSQIA
defense. 188 Florida may not have to look far for the case that will set this
new direction, as one Florida hospital system is already litigating with
PSQIA as its principal argument. 189 While a federal district court in
Florida recently agreed to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the
hospital’s challenge to Amendment 7, this decision will likely only
delay, not deter, a case destined for federal court review.190 With
determined parties and the sustainability of Amendment 7 in the balance
post-PSQIA, this case and the role it plays in further re-establishing
meaningful peer review and improving the quality of patient care in
Florida will be important to watch.191

will lower costs associated with attorney fees and insurances premiums, while also reducing the
overall cost of collecting peer review materials. Id. at 41, 91.
187. See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 123, 140 and accompanying text. Florida hospitals should be encouraged
by recent state court decisions in Illinois and Kentucky that have upheld PSQIA protections for
hospitals that restructured their internal processes to comply with the PSQIA and its PSES
guidelines. See The Dep’t of Fin. and Prof’l Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 970 N.E. 2d 552, 557-558
(Ill. App. 2d, 2012) (finding that the quality improvement reports created by the pharmacy under its
tracking and reporting system were privileged under the PSQIA when Walgreen’s vice-president
stated in her affidavit that the pharmacy did not create, maintain, or otherwise have in its possession
any incident reports other than those quality improvement reports in question that were transmitted
to its federally certified PSO); Fancher v. Shields, No. 10-CI-4219, (Jefferson Cir. Ct, Ky. Aug. 16,
2011) (holding that Congress provided for broad confidentiality and legal protections of information
collected and reported voluntarily to a PSO for the purposes of improving the quality of medical
care and patient safety). But see Morgan v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., No. 08 CV 4850, (Pa. D & C.3d, June
14, 2011) (finding that the hospital failed to meet its burden that the PSQIA protected the incident
report being sought because it could have been prepared principally for purposes other than those
that the PSQIA protects).
189. See Complaint, Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. Guillermo et. al, No. 2:10-cv-00700-CEHDNF, 2010 WL 5809357 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010). Stating that the Florida courts have failed to
conclusively establish the constitutionality of Amendment 7 and its relationship to Florida statutes
and federal laws, LMHS’ motion seeks a declaration clarifying its rights and obligations under
Amendment 7 and a determination on the constitutionality of Amendment 7 in relation to the
PSQIA. Id. at *5. In order to meet the statutory requirements of peer review protection afforded by
the PSQIA, LMHS executed a Patient Safety Organization Professional Services Agreement with
Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC (“MPRR”) on September 2, 2009 and implemented the LMHS
Patient Safety Evaluation System to identify, collect, and analyze PSWP for purposes of reporting
such PSWP to MPRR. Id. at *15-16.
190. U.S. Court in Florida Will Abstain From Considering Challenge to Florida’s Patients
Right to Know Amendment, IX HEALTH LAW. WKLY. 47 (Dec. 9, 2011).
191. See id.
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